Section 3 · 10
Iran Today
Sixteen sectors, each a card you can open. Every figure below carries its label, its year and its source — and everything must be read against the 2026 context, so that context comes first and cannot be skipped.
The expertise priorities were derived from these conditions. If you want to check whether the priorities follow from the evidence, this is the evidence.
Reading note — the 2026 context, and how to weigh what follows
The June 2025 conflict was followed by a far larger war beginning 28 February 2026, a Strait of Hormuz closure, a US naval blockade of Iranian ports from 13 April 2026, a roughly three-month national internet blackout, and ceasefires that repeatedly broke down; the 17 June 2026 MOU — including its “at least USD 300 billion” reconstruction commitment — has collapsed. Nearly every 2026 figure below must be read against that. Our interpretation: the Knowledge Center is built to be robust to two states of the world — reconstruction under an agreement, and prolonged sanctions and conflict.
Source rules applied throughout: peer-reviewed and multilateral sources are preferred; national statistical registers beat UN estimates for population data; Iranian state-linked, diaspora/exile and opposition-affiliated outlets are used only where a figure is attributed to a named official or institution, and are labelled at every point of use; warcosts.org is excluded entirely.
VerifiedReportedResearch findingOur interpretationWhat these labels mean
Why no reconstruction total is published
There is no multilateral damage assessment for Iran — none has been commissioned, though Iran formally requested UN involvement on 28 July 2026. What circulates: $144bn (FDD central estimate, methodology stated, range $50–300bn) and ~$270bn (Iranian authorities, via reporting that itself calls the figure impossible to verify). The “$300bn reconstruction fund” was a proposed financing vehicle in a collapsed MOU — never a needs assessment. Our interpretation: there is no credible aggregate reconstruction estimate for Iran as of August 2026; this site publishes the range with both attributions and the absence of a multilateral assessment — never a single number.